aftermath of the post-World War II baby boom, 6 and healthcare costs are growing faster than the economy although yielding genuine improvements in health outcomes. 7 So current programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid -but the latter two in particular -face worse long-term fiscal prospects than they would under different demographic and technological circumstances, causing the overall picture to be one of budgetary unsustainability.
Yet these trends are both visible far in advance and well-known. In principle, they could easily be addressed through some combination of slowing projected spending growth and increasing projected revenues. And even if such adjustments are to a degree painful relative to staying on the current course if this were feasible, the need for them carries no implication whatsoever of the need to risk a budget catastrophe.
That brings us, however, to the second Matryoshka doll, political economy. To make the painful changes that are necessary, one needs an at least moderately well-functioning political system. Adverse changes that disappoint people who were relying on the continuation of existing law or policy are hard to implement without cooperation between significant elements of both the Democratic and Republican parties' leadership. Embrace of adverse changes by one side acting alone would expose it to devastating political attack by the other side. Moreover, perhaps neither party should be expected to act unless enough of the powerful interest groups to which it answers are sufficiently on board.
Attracting sufficient support for a budget deal that would be ambitious enough to restore long-term fiscal solvency is inherently a challenging enterprise. Even if everyone recognizes that some sort of deal is necessary, any actual deal will leave some groups worse off than a hypothetical alternative deal in which someone else had to sacrifice more instead. Insofar as multiple independent actors individually or collectively have an effective veto, prospective dealmakers face a holdout problem, akin to that which a local government would face if it wanted to build a road and did not have eminent domain powers.
These problems are not inherently insoluble, of course. In the 1980s, Democrats and
Republicans repeatedly agreed to budget deals that required various stakeholders to accept terms they partly disliked and that in principle could have been improved from their perspectives. 8 But the less the common ground between the parties, the harder this is to accomplish. Over the last two-plus decades, the Republican Party's march to the extreme right has greatly increased the difficulty of finding common ground at the leadership level, even leaving aside the challenge of selling a deal to one's stakeholders.
In particular, when Republicans unconditionally reject any tax increases whatsoever, and indeed repeatedly demand further huge tax cuts, the model that underlay multiple bipartisan deals in the 1980s is effectively ruled out. Yet the fundamental problem may go deeper than party strategies. I increasingly fear that social and intellectual discord in our society have grown so great, and have so radically undermined cooperative norms at the political party, interest group, and individual voter levels, that productive bargaining over apportionment of the pain of restoring long-term fiscal sustainability simply cannot be done any more. The Republicans' evident willingness in mid-2011 to force a completely voluntary and unnecessary federal debt default, unless they were paid sufficient ransom (a strategy that Republican leaders have proudly announced that they are eager to repeat) is case in point. I thus am personally skeptical that the U.S. political system will prove up to the challenge, and conclude instead that broader social and 8 During the Reagan Administration, the important bipartisan tax and budget deals that were enacted included the following: (1) a deficit-reducing tax increase in 1982, (2) a Social Security fix with benefit cuts and tax increases in 1983, (3) a deficit-reducing tax increase in 1984, (4) the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Balanced Budget Act in 1985, scenario in which U.S. government bond prices turn out (at least ex post) to have been sustained by a price bubble that suddenly and discontinuously collapses is hard to dismiss, especially given concerns that fundamentally skewed incentives in the financial sector, encouraging market actors to pursue short-term profits while disregarding downside tail risk, are still in place. 10 Hence the point that, if severe pessimism is at least potentially justified, the third and innermost
Matryoshka doll in the march to a U.S. budget catastrophe will prove to have been a financial markets problem.
Even without grounds for concern about a catastrophic credit market event, there would be ample reason to place the U.S. government's budget on a sustainable long-term path as soon as possible. An initial point relates to the advantages of "smoothing" the implementation of adverse changes. As I have discussed elsewhere, both tax rate increases and healthcare and other spending cuts tend to have rising marginal disutility in each discrete period (such as a year).
This tends to make it good policy (at least as a baseline approach) to try to spread the pain across all periods, rather than waiting until immediate change is unavoidable. 11 Moreover, while our extremely slow recovery from the "Great Recession" and the continuation of high unemployment levels strongly indicate postponing the implementation of adverse changes that would curtail current consumer demand, this does not mean that we should postpone determining and announcing future changes, which would aid people's long-term planning. Accordingly, while the threat of a budget catastrophe may be the most important reason for acting sooner rather than later to correct our budgetary path, it is far from being the only reason. 10 See, e.g., Douglas A. It thus is worth asking how tax-side changes to the federal budget could help contribute to restoring fiscal sustainability. The rest of this paper divides this question into two categories, pertaining first to the existing income tax and then to some possible new tax instruments.
II. THE EXISTING INCOME TAX
A. Base-Broadening's Budgetary Potential
The most obvious and appealing way to achieve budgetary improvement through the existing income tax would be through base-broadening. Numerous preferential rules for particular types of consumption, business activity, or saving create uneven treatment across these broad categories, typically with little in the way of a persuasive policy rationale. Substantial base-broadening would therefore be desirable even in the absence of a potential budget catastrophe.
When one adds in the threat of such a catastrophe, the case for base-broadening becomes truly compelling. What is more, it could potentially bring about an enormous improvement in our long-term fiscal outlook. According to the Tax Policy Center, items that are officially defined as "tax expenditures" (a term I further discuss below) will increase the budget deficit by almost $1.3 trillion in 2011, rising to more than $1.7 trillion in 2016. 12 Even if one believes, as I have argued elsewhere, that some of the items on the list are not actually properly defined as tax expenditures, and/or ought not to be repealed, 13 this still leaves considerable scope for budgetimproving changes that would independently be good policy. The problem in making significant budgetary progress through base-broadening is simply one of political will and achieving consensus.
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Even if such progress were otherwise available, however, it would raise in some circles the question of whether wide-ranging tax expenditure repeal, unless accompanied by other, revenue-losing tax changes, would involve excessive reliance on the "tax" rather than the "spending" side of the budget to pivot back towards fiscal sustainability. I therefore next consider how tax expenditure repeal should relate to concern about this distinction. the value of a $10,000 policy is equivalent to taxing me on this income and handing me a $3,500
health insurance subsidy that would be classified as government spending. With that structure, however (which would more straightforwardly reflect the exclusion's primarily allocative purpose), 16 both tax revenues and government spending would officially be $3,500 higher, causing the government to seem larger than under the actual policy even though the end result would be exactly the same.
Once we recognize that the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is best viewed as hidden or indirect government spending, 17 it becomes reasonably clear that repealing the subsidy makes the government smaller. Use or non-use of the tax system as a delivery mechanism for the subsidy should not affect this conclusion, even though it will determine whether repeal of the subsidy increases officially measured tax revenues.
The disconnect between officially measured revenues and the size of government has important implications for the design of tax reform. For nearly thirty years, the dominant tax reform design has emphasized revenue neutrality, to be achieved by offsetting the revenue gain from base-broadening by lowering income tax rates. During consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Democrats and Republicans alike viewed revenue neutrality as a device permitting them to table their ongoing dispute concerning the proper size of government. They were intellectually mistaken, however, given that (as tax expenditure analysis helps show) revenue neutrality is merely a semantic, rather than a substantively meaningful, concept.
While the myth that revenue neutrality is substantively meaningful may have proven useful in 1986, we should not be fooled by it today. Since tax expenditure repeal is best viewed 16 See Shaviro, 1986-Style Tax Reform, supra, at 823. 17 "Spending" is not always synonymous with "allocative policy." For example, welfare benefits provided under the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program is no less primarily distributional in character than levying an income tax.
as in substance a spending cut rather than a tax increase, the only good reason to package it with tax rate reduction is if one happens to support the latter change entirely on its own merits. To be sure, if one starts from a decision to cut rates, then a 1986-style package has a budgetary rationale, at least compared to standalone rate-cutting, inasmuch as it provides financing.
However, the same would be equally true of packaging the rate cuts with military withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Accordingly, even if substantial budgetary gains were available via the repeal of tax expenditures but one wanted to avoid increasing the size of government, there would be no implication that rate cuts -reducing the budgetary gain -should be adopted. Given, however, that rate cuts not only may be considered appealing for their own sake, but conceivably could be part of an overall package that restored fiscal sustainability, I next examine whether rationales other than "revenue neutrality" could support rate-cutting under current circumstances
C. The Case Against Cutting Individual Income Tax Rates Even if the Base is
Substantially Broadened
Until such time as there is very substantial improvement in the prospects for long-term U.S. fiscal sustainability, it would verge on recklessness to give any serious consideration to significant tax rate cuts, including extension of the 2001 Bush tax cuts. Indeed, this would be true even if the overall enactment was budget-neutral due to base-broadening, given the lost opportunity that this would represent to improve the long-term picture by repealing tax preferences. Thus, under present circumstances, what I call "1986-style tax reform," in which a package of base-broadening is adopted with the goal of being budget-neutral and perhaps also distribution-neutral, simply does not make sense.
18 18 See Shaviro, 1986-Style Reform, supra.
The most obvious change in circumstances since 1986 is budgetary. Although deficits were a major policy concern in the mid-1980s, the long-term fiscal picture was far less dire.
Accordingly, the massive political effort that was needed to eliminate well-entrenched special interest tax benefits could reasonably be justified, despite the critique that it might crowd out deficit reduction efforts. Today, the extreme danger of a budgetary catastrophe that our political system may be ill-suited to stave off makes the same strategy considerably riskier and more dubious.
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In addition, the efficiency gains available from reducing the marginal tax rates faced by individuals were far greater in 1986 than now, given that, at the time, the top rate was 50 percent, whereas today it is only 35 percent. 20 In general (all else equal), the lower the rate that one starts from, the smaller the efficiency gain from reducing it. In addition, while the 1986 tax reform process showed that base-broadening and rate reduction may be political complements, from the standpoint of efficiency they are better viewed as substitutes. 21 Base-broadening tends to reduce the elasticity of taxable income, thereby potentially increasing the optimal tax rate if one is trading off concerns of distribution against those of efficiency.
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A further important change in circumstances since 1986 relates to that era's goal of making the overall tax reform package roughly distribution-neutral as between people at different income levels. Once again, the idea was to take a source of political dispute off the Neither of these two tables is above criticism in its treatment of capital gains. Table 1 , by excluding them, avoids the "bunching" problem of effectively mischaracterizing people who have an unusually high-income year by reason of selling an appreciated asset that has gained value over many years. Nonetheless, I would not argue that no such changes should be adopted until the longterm U.S. budget situation has significantly improved, given that this might mean forgoing otherwise feasible improvements to the tax system. Rather, I would just argue that any such changes should be contemporaneously fully financed -although, even so, the long-term budget situation might be slightly worsened via the use of "low-hanging fruit" that could otherwise have been used to improve our long-term fiscal prospects 29 -and that the risk of diverting political effort from budgetary improvement must also be kept in mind.
With these caveats in mind, the main potentially revenue-losing tax reform ideas that might be worth considering despite the dire federal budget situation, and that in its absence clearly would merit serious attention, include the following:
1) Replacing the income tax with a progressive consumption tax -In academic tax policy circles, recent years have seen a shift towards "an emerging new consensus (widespread if not universal) that an ideal consumption tax is unambiguously superior to an ideal income tax, taking into account concerns of both efficiency and distribution." 30 The two main models for a progressive consumption tax are (a) the X-tax, which essentially is a value-added tax (VAT) with 29 wages being deducted by businesses and included by workers, rather than ignored, so that progressive rates can apply to them, and (b) a consumed income tax, which would look somewhat like the existing income tax except that all saving would be deducted while borrowing was included in "income."
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To be sure, the emerging consensus, even assuming that it is correct, does not automatically establish that a real-world consumption tax, comparably progressive to the existing income tax, would be superior in practice despite the political compromises that inevitably would accompany its actual enactment. 32 However, one reason for optimism that a replacement consumption tax would be an improvement is that it would not have to deal with the realization requirement, thus permitting significantly reduced statutory and tax planning complexity.
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Shifting from income to consumption taxation may be budget-negative if statutory tax rates stay the same. After all, a well-designed consumption tax, unlike a well-designed income tax, excludes annual returns to saving from the tax base. However, as Joseph Bankman and
David Weisbach have noted, it can be misleading to view the consumption tax base as "narrower," given the basic bias in an income tax against later consumption relative to sooner consumption. The "broader" base in an income tax simply means that the tax rate for consumption rises as one defers engaging in it, whereas a properly functioning consumption tax imposes the same tax rate on consumption in all periods. 34 Thus, while it is true that shifting to a consumption tax might be budget-negative if one kept everything else the same, a better comparison might involve nominally increasing the tax rate so that consumption on average faced the same tax rate as before.
The risk of a budgetary catastrophe affects the analysis in two main ways, apart from the obvious point that focusing on the tax base shift might divert attention from the arguably more urgent problem of restoring fiscal sustainability. First, when shifting from an income tax to a progressive consumption tax, it is natural to think (1986-style) in terms of budget neutrality and distributional neutrality, in order to offer a clean comparison along the key dimension that is being changed. However, given both the dangerousness of our current fiscal course and the clear conceptual distinction between tax base choice on the one hand and the use of the tax system to deliver targeted benefits on the other hand, this arguably should be done relative to an income tax that has been shorn of the tax expenditures that Congress is willing to eliminate. 35 Second, the possibility (discussed in section III below) that a VAT would be enacted in the course of moving towards long-term budgetary balance might need to be considered as part of the tax reform process. At least if the VAT-like X-tax structure is used, administrative coordination between that system and a newly enacted VAT might need to be considered.
2) Corporate tax reform -In the last few years, broad support across the political spectrum has emerged for lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate, at least if this can be done as part of a budgetarily responsible broader package (such as one with offsetting corporate or business sector-related base-broadening). The key rationale is that the U. reflecting tax preferences or tax planning opportunities, the effective U.S. corporate tax rate is more in the mainstream.
In addition, given that equity-financed corporate income is potentially double-taxed (at both the entity and shareholder levels), whereas that which is debt-financed effectively faces U.S. taxation at most once, parity between the corporate and individual rates creates a significant aggregate bias in favor of debt financing. Tax experts have long condemned this bias, but in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which reflected high levels of corporate leverage, it may look even worse than it did before. 36 Against this background, reducing corporate rates relative to individual rates may reduce the tax code's aggregate debt bias, by making equity finance taxpreferable in more circumstances.
Despite the widespread support for corporate rate reduction, there is a good argument that it should take a backseat to other reform proposals that are similarly motivated. In particular, consider proposals to adopt either (1) an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), providing the equivalent of an interest deduction with respect to corporate stock, or else (2) an allowance for corporate capital (ACC), providing a uniform cost of capital deduction, for corporate debt and equity alike, without regard to actual interest paid. I have argued elsewhere that U.S. corporate tax reform should prioritize these proposals relative to considering corporate rate reductions.
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Either way, even if the change was financed by corporate or business-sector basebroadening, the "low-hanging fruit" argument makes its adoption potentially budgetarily disadvantageous. Again, this is not to say that one of these reforms should not be adopted, but 36 3) International tax reform -Albeit with less consensus, there has also been a discernible increase in recent years in both political and academic support for lowering the U.S. tax burden on outbound investment by U.S. multinationals, and perhaps even for exempting from U.S. tax their foreign source active business income. 38 This shift in sentiment reflects that other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, have been moving towards exemption, and that rising global capital mobility may reduce the U.S.'s ability to benefit from taxing resident multinationals' foreign source income. 39 Once again, however, even if one still favors the change on balance, 40 budgetary concerns clearly do not help. 41 One way of addressing them in part, while also potentially increasing economic efficiency, would be to eliminate U.S.
companies' windfall gain from the shift to exemption by imposing a one-time transition tax on their pre-enactment foreign earnings that have not yet been taxed here.
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III. SOME POSSIBLE NEW TAX INSTRUMENTS
If Congress ever decides seriously to address the long-term U.S. fiscal gap on the revenue side, new tax instruments may well play a significant role, both because there are several plausible candidates and in view of longstanding income tax preferences' political entrenchment.
The following are some very brief observations on several of the leading candidates. 44 Many commentators believe that VAT adoption is likely to be crucial in the U.S. to restoring fiscal sustainability and perhaps even making tax reform more affordable. 45 VATs still attract criticism in U.S. academic debate, both on the right for being potentially too effective a revenue-raising tool 46 and on the left for being (at least as considered in isolation) regressive. 47 Nonetheless, arguably the main obstacle to their adoption in the U.S. is simply the overwhelming public and political distaste both for tax increases of any kind, and more generally for taking seriously the need to make hard choices in order to avoid a fiscal catastrophe.
An optimistic scenario might hold, however, that VAT adoption will become feasible and even likely at some point, either in direct response to a full-blown budget crisis or as part of a 1980s-style grand bargain between Democrats and Republicans in which both the revenue and outlay sides of the federal budget are seriously addressed. Conceivably, VAT enactment might be accompanied by efforts to "earmark" the revenues so that they could only be used for particular purposes, such as to fund entitlements spending, in the hope that this would limit any inclination to dissipate the budgetary gain through increased outlays. Earmarking is always a challenging proposition given that money is fungible, but it can conceivably have an effect if political actors regard as meaningful the distinction between general and earmarked revenues.
If the U.S. adopts a VAT, adopting a proper design from the start is important, as "mistakes made at introduction are hard to undo." 48 Many experts agree that a well-designed VAT should reach a broad measure of domestic consumption, with a single positive rate for all items and a fairly high threshold for requiring businesses to participate. 49 Exempting
"necessities" such as food, in the hope that this would make the VAT more progressive, not only increases complexity and inefficiency, but is poorly-targeted as distributional policy, since "[i]n absolute terms, the benefit … accrues mainly to middle and high-income consumers who buy more expensive varieties of food." 50 (2) Carbon and other energy taxes -At least with adequate global cooperation, a welldesigned carbon tax 51 could address global warming while also raising revenue, most likely starting at well over $100 billion per year. 52 Carbon taxes, like other Pigovian pollution taxes that put a price on the negative externalities created by economic actors that otherwise (since not priced by the market) would cause them to have suboptimal incentives, can actually increase efficiency, rather than increasing aggregate distortion in the manner of even a well-designed income or consumption tax. Moreover, while cap-and-trade systems, such as that which the U.S.
Congress recently considered, are in principle potentially interchangeable with carbon taxes, the latter are widely viewed as likely to be economically and administratively preferable in practice.
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It is conceivable that a carbon tax would also be budgetarily preferable to cap-and-trade at the time of adoption. When cap and trade systems are adopted or seriously considered, it is common for emission permits at least initially to be given away to existing producers, rather than sold at auction -even though "economists across the political spectrum have condemned free permit allocation as a pernicious combination of inefficiency and inequity." 54 While political pressures to favor the energy industry might be expected either way, to a large extent "the support for free permit allocation rests on an artifact of labeling. "'Cap and trade with free permit allocation' and 'carbon tax with all revenue used to make transfer payments to [energy companies'] shareholders are two labels for the same underlying policy," but only the latter attracts "no support."
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Absent the enactment of a general carbon tax, narrower energy taxes could also increase efficiency while raising significant revenue. It has been estimated, for example, that the optimal gasoline tax would be twice as high as that currently imposed in the U.S., 56 though largely due to negative externalities from driving, such as the effect on congestion, wholly apart from carbon emission. 57 Increasing coal excise taxes might also be significantly better than doing nothing, although both the efficiency benefits and the revenue potential of carbon taxation are reduced when the tax base is narrower. 3) Financial transactions tax (FTT) -The idea of levying a tax on certain financial transactions, such as secondary trading of equity shares, has been around for many decades. In recent years, however, it has received renewed attention, due both to its apparent revenue potential and the hope that it might address ostensibly harmful excess liquidity in capital markets and thus, for example, reduce price volatility and the formation of bubbles. 58 For example, an FTT of 0.5 percent on U.S. equity trades -assuming it functioned effectively, which might involve considerable difficulty given the likely need to apply it to transactions using derivatives -might raise $28 billion or more, according to recent estimates. 59 If such a tax, as a side effect,
were to "curtail short-term speculation, thereby reducing wasted resources, market volatility, and asset mispricing," 60 then it might be viewed as no less Pigovian in character than a carbon tax or other pollution tax.
Unfortunately for this hopeful view of FTTs, a recent study by Thornton Matheson concludes that " [t] here is no convincing evidence that [they] lower short-term price volatility," and indeed they might increase it by discouraging and reducing trades. 61 In addition, an FTT would "reduce security values and raise the cost of capital for issuers, particularly for issuers of frequently traded securities." 62 More generally, FTTs are misdirected from a Pigovian standpoint since, even if securities trading activity can in some cases involve resource waste 63 innovative new tax proposal, involving the imposition of a financial activities tax or FAT that, depending on its design, could address one or more of these problems while also potentially raising significant revenue. 65 Although FAT variants differ, the basic idea might be to impose a tax on financial firms' net cash flows, as determined without subtracting high-end (such as executive) compensation.
Thus, the tax base might resemble that under an income tax except that all business outlays (other than nondeductible high-end compensation) would be expensed, rather than being in some cases capitalized. The rationale for expensing would be to impose tax only on financial firms' extra-normal returns, 66 which might be thought to indicate the presence either of monopoly rents or of heads I win, tails you lose" risk-taking. The rationale for not deducting high-end compensation would be that executives and other highly compensated employees, rather than shareholders, were likely to be the ones actually capturing extra-normal profits and making unduly risky bets that reflected their skewed incentives.
Such an FAT could potentially raise significant revenue. The IMF Staff estimates that its annual tax base might equal 2.8 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). 67 This suggests that an FAT with a rate of, say, 15 percent could raise more than $60 billion per year. 68 Obviously, there would be major design challenges to consider, such as defining the set of financial firms to which it applied (preferably including those that were embedded in predominantly non-financial firms). 69 What is more, the U.S. financial industry's staggering economic and political power might make adoption of the FAT extremely challenging even if the U.S. political environment were not otherwise so rabidly hostile to revenue-raising. Nonetheless, the FAT clearly deserves to be on the list of new tax instruments that the U.S. should consider, partly as an independent matter of sound fiscal design but all the more so if the revenues could help forestall a U.S. budget catastrophe.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the demographic causes of the long-term U.S. fiscal gap, only severe dysfunction in our political system, abetted by malfunctioning and discontinuously responsive global financial markets, could lead to a U.S. budget catastrophe. Unfortunately, the risk of disaster appears to be alarmingly high. The rising danger has implications both for income tax reform and for the possible adoption of new tax instruments.
